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| # | Post Title | Result Info | Date | User | Forum |
| 373rd General Services anyu information | 21 Relevance | 1 month ago | walkerstoo | INSTRUCTIONS FOR RESEARCH | |
| 373rd General Services Regiment Company E | 21 Relevance | 19 years ago | awj5343 | WWII ENGINEERS | |
| Researching anything about this unit. I have official history, esp intererested in info about time at Camps Clairborne and Ft Hood Thanks | |||||
| 393rd Special Services/General Services | 32 Relevance | 19 years ago | SonofaMP | LOOKING FOR... | |
| The only reference i found for to the 393rd Eng GS Reg. was found here: Historic Context for the African American Military Experience: Section 9, Part III 393rd Engineer General Service Regiment- Activated at Camp Clairborne, Louisiana, and returned after a short stay at Camp Robinson. Staged at Camp Patrick Henry, Virginia. The 38th Engineer General Service Regiment is listed as a non-divisional unit for the Normandy invasion. 38th Eng Reg WWII Timeline 1 October l933 organized as the 38th Engineers (General Service) Regiment. 13 January 1941 the 38th Engineers (General Service) Regiment was re-designated as the 38th Engineers (Combat) Regiment. 28 May 1941 activated as such at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Participated in the Carolina Maneuvers, September - November 1941. 14 March 1942 departed Charleston, South Carolina. 30 March 1942 arrived on Ascension Island and began construction of an airfield. 19 August 1942 departed Ascension Island. 23 August 1942 landed at Pointe Norie, West Africa. 30 December 1942 first increment moved to Dakar, Africa 17 February 1943 second increment moved to Dakar, Africa 29 May 1943 the 38th Engineers (Combat) Regiment was re-designated as the 38th Engineer Combat Regiment. 8 December 1943 departed Africa. 1 January 1944 the 38th Engineer (Combat) Regiment was re-designated as the 38th Engineer General Service Regiment. 4 January 1944 arrived in England 9 June 1944 landed in France and was assigned to the Normandy Base Section. 13 March 1946 arrived New York. 14 March 1946 deactivated at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey. | |||||
| 373rd Engineers | 30 Relevance | 15 years ago | colinhotham | INTRODUCE YOURSELF | |
| Welcome Terry to the 'UK branch' of this great website. I have been here with Marion for around six years (I left and rejoined) and I've made some great friends across the pond. I looked up our 'bible' in reference to the 373rd, but no mention of what they did in the UK, only later under the command of Col Frank F. Bell around Le Havre, Rouen and Brest where they undertook limited rehabilitation of these towns. In 1942 BOLERO was the plan that set the US Engineer Machine in motion to deal with the arrival of our allies from across the Atlantic. The 373rd w ... | |||||
| 393rd Special Services/General Services | 28 Relevance | 16 years ago | kkopacki | LOOKING FOR... | |
| There are two listings for the 393rd. One is a General Service Regiment, the other a Special Service Regiment, which in this case would make more sense, as it would appear to go along with the special liason info that I provided above. If that is the case, the 393rd was with the 2nd Ranger Battalion and would have been at Normandy at one point. If you are referring to the Special Services 393rd, they didn't get to France until September, October 44. I believe the port of entry for them was La Harve. I'll have to pull my records out this evening, but I don't think they were attached to the 2nd Rangers or had any interaction at all. I could be wrong thought, it's been a long day Ken | |||||
| 393rd Special Services/General Services | 28 Relevance | 19 years ago | Walts Daughter | LOOKING FOR... | |
| SLU and SCU were special liason units. They handled receipt and transmission of messages. ===================== On 15 March 1944 General Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, sent to General Eisenhower a letter which set forth the basis upon which German Ultra intelligence was to be made available to U.S. Army field commands in the European Theatre of Operations. The following paragraphs are taken from the letter: "7.D. The receipt and distribution, at the field commands, of messages containing or relating to Ultra intelligence, is handled by Special Liaison Units furnished and controlled by the Director General, G.C. & C.S. The personnel of these units includes American officers attached to MID, War Department, London. "7.F. One or more American officers assigned to MID, War Department, London, will be detailed to each American field command which receives Ultra intelligence. These officers will be subject to the administration and discipline of the commands to which they are detailed. They will work under the control of the G-2 or A-2 of the command as part of his staff. They will have had a period of training at G.C. & C.S., and, if possible, with operational commands in the Mediterranean Theatre, and this training will be directed toward equipping them to use Ultra intelligence effectively and securely. Their primary responsibility will be to evaluate Ultra intelligence, present it in useable form to the Commanding Officer and to such of his senior staff officers as are authorized Ultra recipients, assist in fusing Ultra intelligence with intelligence derived from other sources, and give advice in connection with making operational use of Ultra intelligence in such fashion that the security of the source is not endangered. If at any time the flow of Ultra intelligence is not sufficient to occupy fully the time of these officers, they may be used for other related intelligence assignments." ====================== The SLU/SCU detachments were composed largely of British officers and other ranks, although a number of American officers participated in the work and, in a few cases, commanded the detachments. The detachments were controlled by SLU 8, at SHAEF, and were attached to the U.S. field commands. Most of the detachments served the G-2 (or A-2) section but their anomalous administrative position led to a repeated and important recommendation for an organizational change. ============= For more information on this subject, visit this link: | |||||
| The passing of General Goodpaster | 26 Relevance | 21 years ago | Walts Daughter | ANNOUNCEMENTS, GET WELLS & FAREWELLS | |
| Here's more info that Al sent me. Mr. Kincer: The only information on General Goodpaster that I have at this time is the following: Viewing at the Everly-Wheatley Funeral Home, 1500 W. Braddock Road in Alexandria, Virginia, on Tuesday, May 24, 2:00-4:00 p.m. and 6:00-8:00 p.m. Funeral at Arlington National Cemetery on Wednesday, May 25 at 1:00 p.m. with the service at the Old Post Chapel, Fort Myer. Internment to follow. - If I receive any other information, I will let you know. We have lost a great American and a dear friend! - Joellen Bland ---------------------------------------------------- Andrew Goodpaster; General led West Point past scandals By Adam Bernstein, Washington Post | May 17, 2005 WASHINGTON -- Army General Andrew J. Goodpaster, the self-effacing presidential adviser and commander of NATO who was summoned from retirement to lead the scandal-tainted US Military Academy at West Point, died yesterday at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. General Goodpaster, 90, had prostate cancer. General Goodpaster spent more than four decades as a soldier and statesman, in which time he saw combat in World War II, served as deputy commander of US forces in Vietnam, and advised four presidents. Having retired as commander of NATO forces in 1974, he returned to active service three years later to become the 51st commandant of West Point, his alma mater. The school had been pummeled by a cheating scandal in which 152 cadets were dismissed. Also, it had admitted its first class of women to some controversy. With his avuncular looks and measured manner, he was said to have helped rebuild the academy's reputation by his mere presence after the cheating episode. He also eased the women's transition to the school, telling staff members he would ''escort them to the door with a handshake" should they fail to make the women feel welcome. He stepped down in 1981 and three years later received the Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest civilian honor. Andrew Jackson Goodpaster Jr. was born Feb. 12, 1915, in Granite City, Ill., where his father worked for the railroad. Hoping to pursue a career as a math teacher, he enrolled at McKendree College in Lebanon, Ill., but he withdrew during the Depression when money was scant. To continue his education, he sought a West Point appointment and entered the Class of 1939. During World War II, he led an engineering battalion over a minefield and under hostile fire, actions for which he received the Distinguished Service Cross, the second-highest military award for valor after the Medal of Honor. His other decorations included the Silver Star, two awards of the Legion of Merit, and two awards of the Purple Heart. After doing war planning for the General staff in Washington, he entered Princeton University, where he received a master's degree in engineering as well as a master's degree and a doctorate in international relations. His battlefield and academic credentials -- along with a regard for anonymity -- impressed a number of ranking officials. He became special assistant to the chief of staff of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe from 1950 to 1954 and a favorite of Dwight Eisenhower, the NATO commander. He assisted Eisenhower in forming political and military guidelines for the new treaty organization and was Eisenhower's liaison among such diplomats and politicians as W. Averell Harriman of the United States, Jean Monnet of France, and Hugh Gaitskell of the United Kingdom. Later, President Eisenhower asked General Goodpaster to serve as staff secretary in the White House. He became known as the president's alter ego for his ability to carry out orders in his wide-ranging national security portfolio with minimal need for instruction. Among his mandate was work on what was called the Solarium Conference to plan for the American role in a post-Stalin Soviet Union. Some called him ''the man with the briefcase" for his silent but essential backstage role in practically all military matters. General Goodpaster, wrote one reporter for the New York Herald Tribune, ''looks like a business executive and hides his White House importance behind a quiet facade that lends itself neither to anecdotes nor stuffiness." He remained a key adviser through the Suez crisis, the launching of Sputnik, and the 1960 Soviet downing of the U-2 spy plane piloted by Francis Gary Powers. With President Kennedy, General Goodpaster advanced through a series of sensitive positions on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. President Johnson used him as an intermediary with Eisenhower for military suggestions in the escalating Vietnam War. ''President Johnson asked the question: Can we win in Vietnam and what do we have to do?" General Goodpaster told U.S. News & World Report decades later. ''That question came to me." He advocated a stronger military role to win the war and became frustrated that the political will never materialized. He served as military adviser to the six-man US team involved in the Paris peace talks with the North Vietnamese in summer of 1968 and spent the rest of the year as deputy to Creighton W. Abrams Jr., commander of US forces in Vietnam. From 1969 to 1974, he was NATO supreme allied commander and was said to have been greatly displeased when Alexander M. Haig Jr., the Nixon White House chief of staff, was tapped to replace him. He retired quietly and did not show up for Haig's ceremony, a rare public snub. In later years, General Goodpaster took special assignments from presidents, and he was appointed to positions at a variety of academic and research centers, including the Eisenhower Institute. Otherwise, he allowed himself the luxury of salmon fishing in Labrador with his wife. In addition to his wife of 65 years, Dorothy Anderson Goodpaster of Washington, he leaves two daughters, Susan Sullivan of Alexandria, Va., and Anne Batte of Salisbury, N.C.; seven grandchildren and a great-grandson. © Copyright 2005 Globe Newspaper Company. | |||||
| Documentary - No Bridge Too Far | 21 Relevance | 18 years ago | Walts Daughter | PUBLISHED ARTICLES & MORE | |
| Oh happy search engines! Found a ton of film footage that I MUST have for my documentary! Let's hope Santa (aka family) gives out money this Christmas. =========================== Assorted US Government War Films Program 2 (Signal Corps) 1. PRIVATE SNAFU CARTOON: Private Snafu is shown widespread support of the folks back home. 2. AMERICAN AIRCRAFT BOMB JAPANESE AIRPLANE HANGARS ON THE MARSHALL ISLANDS: US naval anti-aircraft guns pound attacking Japanese planes. After quickly establishing a beachhead, American infantry units advance with an escort of Alligator tanks. Infantry flamethrowers take out Japanese pillboxes. The 13th Air Force knocks out Japanese 90mm coastal guns. Americans capture Japanese anti-aircraft guns. 3. FIREPOWER DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE FOLLOWING WEAPONS: Light carbine, Browning automatic 30-caliber machine guns (water- and air-cooled), 60mm and 81mm mortars, 105mm and 155mm howitzers, bazookas, 37mm and 57mm anti-tank guns, Sherman tanks, tank destroyers and a 240mm howitzer. 4. ENGINEERS AND SEABEES IN ACTION WITH HEAVY EQUIPMENT: Demonstration of a bulldozer. Maintenance units put down portable landing mats at Bougainville and the Aleutians. US engineers purify drinking water for civilians in Naples. USA, 1944, B&W, 45 minutes. ======================================================= Combat Bulletin Number 1 (Signal Corps) 1. Multi-National work crews build American trucks in Naples. 2. Wau, New Guinea: Army Air Force transport planes make landings on an uphill airfield. Air Force meteorologists gather data. Japanese planes bomb Wau Airfield March 11. USAF P-39 fighters provide cover for transport planes evacuating wounded between Wau and Moresby. 3. An American invasion task force stages an offensive against Rendova and Munda. US infantrymen battle Japanese snipers and establish beachheads. 4. Adapted P-51 fighters with bomb racks (A-36) on strafing and dive-bombing missions against Nazi positions over Sicily. 5. A captured Nazi newsreel shows Hitler conferring the Fritz Todt Engineering Award on Albert Speer, Heinrich Himmler reviewing the Hitler Youth Corps and German war workers being honored at the Berlin Sports Palace. USA, 1943, B&W, 37 minutes. ============================================ Operation : Dragoon The Allied Invasion Of The South Of France Second only to the Normandy invasion, this controversial allied invasion came within an eyelash of being scrubbed. Originally planned to coincide with the D-Day invasion, instead it got "bogged down" over military objectives. USA, 1996, B&W, 30 minutes. ========================================= WW2 The Music Videos: The Songs We Sang, The Stars We Loved DVD Features the Andrews Sisters, Frank Sinatra, Bing Crosby, Dorothy Lamour, Bob Hope, Lucille Ball, Abbot & Costello, Carmen Miranda, Spike Jones, Frances Langford, Peggy Lee, Dinah Shore, Betty Hutton, Judy Garland, Kate Smith, and many others who perform their wartime specialties in the music that won the war. The first video program also includes 8 nostalgic newsreels. USA, 1997, B&W/Color, packaged set of 2 DVDs, 120 ========================================== Combat Bulletin Number 11 (Yalta Conference is held at Livadia Palace) 1. Meeting of Allied Leaders: American and British military and political representatives meet at Malta. The Yalta Conference is held at Livadia Palace. FDR, Stalin and Churchill meet February 4th through 12th. 2. British Mosquito bombers attack German shipping off the Norwegian coast. 3. B-24 pilots design and demonstrate an improved high-altitude oxygen mask. 4. French civilians are safely evacuated from Saint Nazaire through a German-Allied truce. 5. American forces capture Saint Vith January 23rd. 6. US Army boots are improved to combat trenchfoot. 7. Maintenance units de-ice and equip with skis a snowed-in Piper Cub plane. 8. Demonstration of a Bailey assault bridge. 9. Activities in Burma: Lieutenant Colonel Seagrave returns to the recaptured village of Nam Kham January 25th. The Allies put pressure on the Japanese at the Western Front in Burma. 10. Army and Navy planes hit Japanese installations. Navy bombers and fighters hit Japanese supply ships near Manila, airfield and military installations on Formosa and strategic points in Indo-China. Army B-29s bomb aircraft factories outside Osaka. 11. Operations in the Philippines: Americans equip and supply Filipinos for the Luzon campaign. The second US amphibious landing at Bataan. USA, 1945, B&W, 30 minutes. ================================= Combat Bulletin Number 2 (5th Army prepares for the invasion of Anzio / The Big Three Session at Potsdam) 1. At Naples harbor the 5th Army prepares for the invasion of Anzio. The landing of men, supplies and heavy equipment at Anzio. Nazi aerial bombardment of Allied forces at Anzio. American forces clear mine fields and establish a beachhead. 2. Operations in Brittany: US forces shell a Nazi garrison at Cezan Island, near Saint-Malo, with a captured German 155mm howitzer August 18th. After light German resistance, the American 3rd Army enters Nantes August 10th. American forces liberate Aincher, and its citizens destroy the last vestiges of the Nazis. Units of the US Third Army battle elements of the German 7th Army. Allied forces discover 2,000--pound bombs at a German airfield. US forces encircle the German 7th Army. 3. A US armored column enters Alençon August 12th. The Allies advance to Sees. A French-manned American tank is shelled by a German 88mm gun. The Allies enter Argentan August 20th. A Canadian armored division closes a German escape route. French patriots volunteer for service at Mortagne August 13th. The Falaise-Argentan pocket is closed August 19th. Canadian and Polish forces unite at Tours. French forces round up German prisoners as General Elfeldt and his aides surrender. General Eisenhower consults with Secretary of War Patterson, General Somervell, British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and General Charles DeGaulle in the Cherbourg Peninsula. 4. Big Three Session at Potsdam: President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes meet with Stalin and Molotov at Soviet headquarters in Potsdam July 18th. Churchill and Eden are replaced at the conference by the newly-elected Attlee and Bevin. Between sessions Truman meets Generals Eisenhower and Bradley and Admiral Leahy. American and British Chiefs of Staff meet at Potsdam. 5. Activities on Okinawa: A maintenance unit salvages engines from wrecked trucks. M4 thanks are equipped with anti-personnel mines (M2A1). Generals Hodges and Daniels meet at 10th Army Headquarters. The 95th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad disassemble and test-fire captured Japanese incendiary shrapnel rockets. 6. The Little David 914mm mortar is loaded with a T1 projectile and test-fired. USA, 1944, B&W, 33 minutes. ===================================================== Combat Bulletin Number 4 (The fight for Bloody Gulch) 1. Chinese civilians are evacuated from Kweilin Liuchow by rail and sampan. US bombing raids stall a Japanese advance on Kweilin. Chinese forces build defenses for a last-ditch stand. General Joseph Stilwell consults with American and Chinese leaders at Kweilin. Chinese coolies aid in the demolition of the Kweilin airstrip by planting thousand-pound bombs along its runways. American demolition crews burn 550 buildings at the Kweilin airfield. Chinese troops demolish a bridge leading into Kweilin. 2. Supplies for the American 1st Army are unloaded from rail cars by civilian workers near Liege, Belgium. An American depot company operates a railway junction. Army engineers repair bridges new Pimster, Belgium. 3. Allies near the Po Valley: The 5th Army's advance is slowed down by a washed-out Bailey bridge at the Secchia River. A US field-artillery unit improvises a ferry to carry ammunition across the Saterno River. An Allied convoy moves through the mountainous terrain of the Gothic Line sector. A chemical company screens the movement of an Allied convoy. 4. American engineers rebuild a bombed-out Japanese airbase on the Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The 7th USAF Bomber Command maintains a weather center at Kwajalein. US personnel load bombs onto Liberators. 5. Invasion of Anguar: Elements of the 5th Fleet neutralize Japanese positions on Anguar with naval artillery. The 81st Infantry Division is the first to hit the beach September 17th. Flamethrowing units ferret out entrenched Japanese. A beachhead is established and supplies and heavy equipment are unloaded. The fight for Bloody Gulch. Obstructions are cleared for advancing armor and artillery. Infantry clean-up. A wounded man of the 81st is rescued under fire. The final phase of the invasion brings mortar and machine-gun action. The remains of a blown-up phosphate plant on Anguar. USA, 1944, B&W, 25 minutes. ========================================= Combat Bulletin Number 6 (Invasion of Southern France) 1. Invasion of Southern France: A fleet of 800 Allied ships assemble for the invasion of Southern France. Navy Secretary Forrestal meets with the US Naval Command. Thousands of airborne troops take off in gliders and land behind Nazi lines near the Riviera. Thousands of paratroopers take off in C-47s and land behind German lines. Airborne forces establish contact with French partisans. The 454th Bomber Group is briefed before the invasion. Light and heavy bombers hit German strongholds in Southern France while fighter planes strafe ground targets. Allied naval vessels shell the southern coast of France. French troops take part in the initial landings. Supplies and reinforcements are quickly brought ashore. Allied forces capture German anti-invasion defenses. An Allied LST is hit by a German radio-controlled flying bomb. Engineers construct an airstrip in a vineyard. The original beachhead force fans out east and west. 2. Northern France: American forces rest before the push for Port de Beau on August 3rd. American forces enter Saint James and capture Bern on August 4th. American paratroopers captured on D-Day are liberated. Nazi collaborators are rounded up by French patriots. Liberation ceremonies take place in Rheims. A German ordnance depot filled with substantial quantities of supplies near Rheims is abandoned by fleeing Germans. 3. Operations in Burma: Heavy monsoons wash out Allied bivouac areas in Kamaing, Mogaung Valley. Chinese forces ferry captured Japanese equipment across the Mogaung River. US engineers modify jeeps for train tracks on the Myitkyina Railroad. The first all-British unit serving under General Stilwell sees action in Burma. US P--40s are loaded with bombs for strikes on the Japanese in Burma. Captured Japanese equipment near Kamaing. Chindits relax after a long campaign. General Stilwell is met by General Frank Merrill at Colombo, Ceylon. 4. US offensive against the Marianas. US aircraft leave carrier flight decks to soften up the Japanese before the invasion. Japanese bombers try to knock out elements of the US Naval Task Force. A crippled US plane returns to a carrier. USA, 1944, B&W, 37 minutes. =============================== Combat Bulletin Number 7 (Battle of the Netherlands: British and Canadian forces captures Hertogenbosch) 1. Battle of the Netherlands: British and Canadian forces captures Hertogenbosch. 2. C-47s of the 9th Carrier Command pick up gliders at Eindhoven, Holland. 3. The Naval Battle of the Philippines: Animated map illustration of US Philippine naval operations. Japanese planes hit the USS Princeton. The Navy's top-ranking ace. Commander David McCampbell, returns to a carrier after a mission. 4. Bombing of Manila airfields: B-24s of the 307th Bomber Group strike Nielson and Nichols airfields south of Manila. 5. Allies move south in Burma. Lord Mountbatten inspects the invasion task force. The Allied invasion of Akyab Island on December 20th is unopposed. 6. Generals Pick and Sultan at the opening ceremony of the Ledo Road. The first Allied convoy to China, January 12th. 7. Tanks of the 13th Corps are bogged down in severe weather. Field-artillery battalions equipped with 105mm howitzers are concealed in tents; snow shoes are issued for the infantry and GIs improvise jeep coverings. 8. Final stages of the Battle of the Bulge. Snow-removal units in action. A disguised German Mark 6 Tank is towed away by the 462nd Ordnance Evacuation Company. 9. Front-line Showers: American fumigation and bath units set up hot showers for the men at the front. 10. Bombing of Berlin: B-17s of the 8th Air Force bomb Berlin, Blockbusters score impressive hits. The first American-built bridges are assembled at the Seine. USA, 1944-45, B&W, 33 minutes. ===================================== War Department Film Communiqué 1 1. Aerial Techniques in the Southwest Pacific: 100 Liberator fortresses and medium Mitchells bomb Hansa Bay. Wewak, New Guinea and Rabaul, New Britain, demonstrating skip and para-frag bombing. US fighters destroy a Japanese fighter, reconnaissance plane and dive bomber in the air. 2. Black construction units rebuild a Munda airfield. 3. The Fifth Army in Italy: General Mark Clark's 5th Army hits the beach at Salerno, drives for Rome and captures Naples and Avellino. Aerial shots of the decimation of Benevento. The 5th Army crosses the Volturno River with pontoon bridges. General Mark Clark delivers a message to American war workers. 4. With the Australians in New Guinea: US cargo planes drop supplies to Australian forces in the jungles of New Guinea, where they fight the Japanese with the aid of the natives. USA, 1943, B&W, 29 minutes. | |||||
| Fuehrer-Begleit-Brigade 16-Dec-44 to Jan-45 by General Remer | 20 Relevance | 19 years ago | rtmxrandy | ANYTHING WWII | |
| Written for the U.S. Army by General Otto Ernst Remer. General Remer was a young, highly decorated officer. He is infamously/famously known to history as the commander of the German Army’s Wacht Regiment "Grossdeutschland" ceremonial guard formation in Berlin. After the July 20, 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler, Remer and his regiment was ordered by the conspirators to arrest Dr. Goebbels and other Nazi officials. However, Goebbels telephoned the very much alive Hitler. Hitler ordered Remer to arrest the conspirators. The rest is history. Remer was promoted to major General and given command of all the wacht battalions and to organize them into a combat formation for the coming Ardennes counter-attack. Here is his account: Fuehrer-Begleit-Brigade 16-Dec-44 to Jan-45 by Remer MS # B-529 The Fuehrer-Begleit-Brigade (The Brigade under the command of Remer) in the Ardennes (16 Dec 44-26 Jan 45) Previous history: During the first part of September, 1944, I was detained by an order of Hitler from his headquarters in Rastenburg while on my way to the front to take over the Fusilierregiment with the "Greater Germany" "Division. I was ordered by him to organize a combat force, later known as the Fuehrer-Begleit-Brigade Hitler's Escort Brigade, the purpose of which was to take over the defense of headquarters which was located about 100 km behind the front. At this time, it was supposed that an air landing of two to three airborne divisions on the part of the Allies was planned against the head- quarters. The Fuehrer Begleit-Brigade existing at that time was too weak for such a task. Besides, my force, which was to be organized, was to be used as a mobile operational reserve within the so-called fortress of LOETZEN, EAST PRUSSIA for engagements outside the limits of the fortress. To this end, I enlarged and formed my force as follows, taking into consideration the units already available there: 1. Brigade Staff 2. Fuehrer according to Mueller, this refers to the Fuehrer Begleit-Brigade signal Battalion (primarily intended for the internal operations of the headquarters). - 2- 3. Fuehrer Air Signal Battalion (aircraft warning Services). Fuehrer antiaircraft regiment Hermann Goering, with 14 batteries ( for active air defense and ground artillery fighting ). Fuehrer Escort Regiment with three battalions. a. One armored personnel carrier battalion (five companies equipped with armored personnel carriers) b. one mobile battalion (four light and one heavy company loaded on amphibian Volkswagens and Steyr command cars) c. One heavy battalion with one tank company one assault gun company one antiaircraft company one combat engineer company one armored reconnaissance company 6. 828 Battalion, on special assignment) Both battalions con- 7. 829 Battalion, on special assignment) sisted of-rather old men (Landeschuetzen) and had originally been intended for guarding headquarters premises which could not yet been used. 8. Medical company This unusual array was the result of the special task on which this combined-arms unit was based. The various units were -3- Equipped with the most modern arms and ammunition and brought up to strength with experienced front-lines soldiers. When Hitler moved his headquarters to BERLIN during the second half of November 1944, my mission was completed. I then stayed several more days with my Brigade in the area of RASTENBERG. At the end of November, 1944, my Brigade was transported by train for commitment on the western front on orders from Hitler. For this purpose, the brigade had to be right reorganized in great haste, with the extraction of units it further needed in the headquarters and the addition of new units. At the beginning of December, the following elements of the Brigade listed above arrived in the area of DAUN (EIFEL): 1. Brigade staff 2. Fuehrer antiaircraft regiment with eight batteries 3. The entire Fuehrer escort regiment 4. The 828 battalion on special assignment (the 829 remained for some time in Rastenburg, and later came to the Fuehrer-Begleit brigade. 5. The Medical company 6. A Signal Company formed out of the Fuehrer Signal Battalion. Moreover, the following were added: 1) Staff of the panzer regiment 2) A panzer battalion from the “Greater Germany†panzer regiment 3) One assault gun Battalion I believe they 120 Battalion, -4- which it previously fought in France and had been reorganized). 4. One light artillery battalion from the 120 Regiment with two light batteries ( five guns each ) and one heavy battery. 5. One OT (Organization Todt) column and one Army supply column. Both of these already only ready for commitment up to 1/5 strength. 6. One horse-drawn bakery and butchery company. 7. One army post office in one workshop company. All recently added elements were insufficiently equipped, in respect to personnel and material, except for weapons and tanks. This was especially true in respect to equipment with vehicles and signal equipment. The staff of the panzer Regiment did not arrive until two days before the offensive and was so defectively the symbol that it could not be used for the time being. The 828 battalion on special assignment did not receive the bicycles designated Fort until the day prior to the offensive. The brigade was organized as follows increased assignment: 1. Brigade staff of General staff officer 2. One Signal Co. ( 1/2 telephone, 1/2 radio) One military police detachment One armored reconnaissance company One motorcycle messenger Detachment 3. Three independent battalions with one armored personnel carrier battalion of five companies One mobile battalion of four companies The 828 Bicycle battalion on special assignment with four companies -5- 4. One panzer Regiment with One battalion of tanks parentheses four companies of Mark IV tanks (and one battalion of assault guns of four batteries) 5. One artillery Battalion 6. One antiaircraft regiment with two battalions a. One light battalion with three batteries (self-propelled) (One company of 20 mm, 1 bar. guns One company of 20 mm for barrel guns, one company with 37 mm guns) b. One heavy battalion with four batteries of six guns at each of 105 mm caliber. 7. Two transportation columns One Medical company One bakery in butcher company Army post office One workshop company 8. Feldersatz replacement training battalion with 1400 men, which had been organized on orders from army. It had about 20% strength with respect to personnel and material. The shortcomings of this organization are attributed to the fact that I received their original staff for the panzer regiment and for that reason the brigade had command three independent battalions which had been armed organized and very different ways. The means of Signal communications of the Brigade were not sufficient for this increased command load. The military police detachment of about 12 men was to -6- weak for and effectual regulation of traffic, especially in difficult terrain. The relation of the heavy weapons the infantry was exaggerated. Engineer unit was completely lacking. However the capacity of the columns, which was enhanced by taking usable vehicle from the rest of the force, was by no means sufficient for well functioning supply service. The small amount of artillery available had no vehicles capable of cross-country travel was also a shortcoming. The few days left before the offensive were intensively used to organize and reorganize the brigade. In addition, the force was trained every day at company level and officers of all ranks were prepared for their coming tasks by discussions about the terrain and map exercises. Naturally, the time at our disposal for these purposes was quite limited, especially inasmuch as a part of the added units did not arrive until the day prior to the offensive. Instead, the Feldersatz battalion was excellently equipped with respect to personnel and equipment in order to guarantee a good, continuous training. The brigade subordinated to the 66 Korps: The Fuehrer-Begleit-Brigade was assembled in the area around Daun during 17 Dec 44. Since the beginning of the offensive , I was at the forward command post of the Fifth Army in DACHSCHEID, northeast of WACHSWEILER. 18 Dec 44 About 1600 of 18 Dec 44, I received the order to take the brigade to the front from the area of Daun by way of GEROLSTEIN, BUEDESHEIM, PRUEM, SCHNEEFIELFORSTHAUS, POTH and AUW in the direction of ST VITH. -7- Mission: to thrust forward nine in a Generally westerly direction by way of ST VITH within the framework of the LXVI Korps, and subordinated to this court. The brigade was set on the march by telephone, with the organization ordered. Organization of the brigade: One. Advanced attachment: one armored reconnaissance Battalion 1. Light Company on Volkswagens One assault gun company Balance of the 2nd battalion Medium Infantry gun company Antiaircraft company 2. brigade staff with reconnaissance company armored regiment 2nd battalion (armored personnel carriers) Artillery battery 3. Antiaircraft regiment 4. Third Battalion (828, on special assignment) on bicycles. What a Brigade set out under the command of the one-day, I traveled the command post of the LXVI korps, which I encountered in WEINSHEIM (5 Km. northeast of PRUEM). I found out about the situation there and I found out that I was to set out with the Brigade by way of roads, AUW, WISCHEID, ANDLER, SCHOENBERG, and HEEUEM the direction of ST VITH. For the time being, I was not ordered to attack ST VITH, but I was given to understand it the intention existed, now as before, to thrust through further to the west with the Brigade toward the Maas after the fall of ST VITH. At any rate, the brigade was not to tie itself up with a battle -8- For ST VITH. As for myself, I drove ahead on the designated road and did not reach the Fort command post of the 18th VGD in WALLERRODER MUHLE until about morning. The road of the advance ordered was completely jammed in bad condition. Traveling of the road was impossible, even for track-laying vehicles. I therefore reckoned with considerable delay of the march movement and reported this fact to the Korps. 19 Dec 44 At the command post of the 18 VGD, I learned that resistance east of ST VITH had become considerably stronger. Besides, I saw that this division was still not very extensively spread put along the front. During the afternoon, I commenced road reconnaissance for the purpose of finding out if there were possibilities of circumventing ST VITH. Because I got unfavorable results from this reconnaissance, I resolved to support the attack of the 18 VGD, set for about noon, with my advance detachment by a thrust on both sides of the road. The advance detachment began to arrive in WALLERRODER MUHLE about 1200. The attack of the 18 VGD, which was commenced with only weak artillery, did not lead to any success. The armored point of my advance detachment, which had, during this, advanced approximately to the bend in the road north of PRUEMERBERG, received rather strong anti- tank fire. The Company attacking through the it's south of the road was repelled with heavy losses by very well-placed enemy artillery fire. My impression was that the enemy had already made himself so strong east of ST VITH that this place could not he taken from the east by an attack emanating from the march movement without a sufficient -9- assembly of heavy weapons. Moreover there were is the fact that only the terrain north of the road appeared to be suited for tank attack, but with an unfavorable assembly area west of the woods “auf der Hoehe†“On the Heightsâ€, especially inasmuch as the road could be reached only under enemy observation from the bottleneck of the road. Besides the street was so badly Jan said Vance of the armored group would have been extremely difficult. During the time falling, I repeatedly received contradicting orders from Heersgruppe, the Fifth Army, and the LXVI Korps, which part lease spoke of an attack against or a capture of ST VITH, partly of a certain subvention of the city any further threats to the west. I decided to circumvent ST VITH to the north, although the road from WALLERRODER MUHLE to MAYERODE had been reported to me as being passable only under certain conditions. It was still the most favorable. At the onset of darkness, the advance detachment set out to MEDELL by way of MAYERODE. The assault gun company, along with the grenadier Company on foot, which were with the advanced Detachment, were sent out from WALLERRODER MUHLE to WALLERRODE. The armored group had begun to reach as Roth at this time, but was very badly waged in with vehicles of other divisions over to east of AUW. Inasmuch as this road was also used by elements of the 6 SS army and was further war molested by elements of the American units and circled in the SCHNEEIFFEL that were breaking out, a traffic jam had come into being that could hardly be disentangled and which the little force of military police belonging to the brigade was not in a position to disentangle. -10- The attack of the elements of the Brigade order to WALLERRODE (all together one assault gun company into grenadier companies) launched at midnight by way of the fork in the road west of WALLERRODE and then by way of KNINELSBERG towards ST VITH had no success. Therefore, I ordered a continued march by way of Miguel and born in the direction of NIEDER-EMMELS. 20 Dec 44 The attack launched during the dawn of 20 Dec by the armored personnel carrier battalion together with an assault gun company, which had arrived in the meantime, lead, after a hasty assembly in the woods north of NIEDER-EMMELS, to the capture of NIEDER-EMMELS and OBER-EMMELS and thereby to the effect of blocking of the road from LIGNEUVILLE to ST VITH. A further thrust in the southern direction aimed at taking SARD-LEZ-ST VITH bogged down in well-placed enemy artillery fire to the three battalions and anti-tank fire. I decided to wait for the deployment of the brigade. All attempts to accelerate this deployment were frustrated by the extremely difficult road conditions in the woods south of NEURODE, where, in part, one vehicle after another had vetoed through one at the time. In addition there was the fact that the lack of motor fuel result from the road difficulties and traffic jams in the case of the armored group. (An amount was already consumed that was threefold as great as that which would was estimated for normal conditions). During the entire day, NIEDER-EMMELS was under heavy artillery fire. 21 Dec 44 I was ordered by LXVI Korps to attack along the road to ST VITH from the NIEDER-EMMELS area on December 21, 44 I had to decline to -11- make this attack as long as the high terrain south of NIEDER-EMMELS was not in our possession. Otherwise I would have to lead an attack with enemy flanking interference. I therefore decided in favor of an attack in a southerly direction for the purpose of taking SARD-LEZ-ST VITH in order to block office last important supply route and in order to have a solid under our feet again for a further thrust because up to this time eroded terrain conditions had been my worst foe. The assembly of the II battalion, which had been brought forward into the hollow just west of the in NIEDER-EMMELS during the darkness, was harassed for such a long time shortly before daylight by suddenly launched, well-placed enemy artillery fire that this battalion was not in the position to move up and thereby take it vantage of the dawn. Because my heavy weapons, the bulk of the tanks and artillery battalion had still not been brought up because of the catastrophic reconditions and because the brigade, moreover, that no support whatsoever, Korps, I called off the attack in view of the superiority of the enemy artillery. I reckoned that the brigade could be deployed by about evening. In order not to let the day slip away on used, I put the II battalion to blocking the road from ST VITH to VIELSALM by taking the advantage of the forests west of SARD-LEZ-ST VITH. Moreover, this time was to send other strong reconnaissance Ford to the southwest and the General direction of SALMCHATEAU and to report the information found out about the forest roads leading in this direction. As for myself, I prepared the attack of the brigade against SARD-LEZ-ST VITH from the road from the north and northwest of the night of 21/22 Dec 1944. My plan was the following: -12- The armored troop was to attack by way of OBER--EMMELS on both sides of the road to SARD-LEZ-ST VITH, will set the III battalion was to penetrate into this locality SARD-LEZ-ST VITH from the area including TOMM and BERG from the northwest, and if possible, to take to the artillery positions presumed to be northwest of the locality by surprise. The attack was to be conducted by surprise and without any artillery preparation, however the artillery was to be ready to fire on demand. Distribution of a sufficient number of forward observers to both combat teams.(sic) As I see. The II battalion, which had been assigned to block the road, was provided as a possible reserve. Shortly before darkness, we were able to bring the artillery battalion into position, after the guns had been towed with vehicles having cross-country ability. The III battalion likewise arrived with its bicycles pulling them along; they are completely covered with mud. The bicycles remained in BORN and, moreover, were not used thereafter during the entire offensive. The II battalion had reported the blocking of the road from ST VITH to the VIELSALM during the afternoon in a very boldly conducted undertaking, moreover further advance in a southerly and southwesterly direction, and an engagement with enemy artillery positions and isolated tanks in the area north of COMMANSTER and HINTERHAUSEN. The result of the road reconnaissance did not sound favorable. Furthermore, captured in the commanders of the 7 Armored Division (U.S.) were reported to have apparently come from a discussion. 22 December and 44 -13- The armored group (the II Battalion, two armored companies and to assault Gun companies) was assembled at 2400 in the area of NIEDER-EMMELSER-HEIDE. The III battalion reported completed assembly in the vicinity of TOMMBERG at about 0100. I led the armored group myself. I set out a powerful reconnaissance along the road from OBER-EMMELS to SARD-LEZ-ST VITH at once, which reported northern edge of the patch of woods south of OBER-EMMELS was rather heavily occupied and that enemy armored cars had been sighted. It was for the reported that the terrain off of the road was not passable at night and that several tanks have already stuck fast. I therefore led the armored group through the bare places in the woods in the direction of TOMMBERG. Up until daylight, I move it forward to the southern edge of the forest north of SARD-LEZ-ST VITH with a tedious effort. This was very difficult undertaking because tanks were sticking fast that every moment in the softening terrain in because the woods were very thick and parts. At times, one tank after another had to be guided in by scouts on foot. As a result of the continuous noise of the motors, the element of surprise loss. During the night, the artillery battalion shelled the enemy artillery positions spotted west of SARD-LEZ-ST VITH with artillery fire observed by Forward observers of the III. battalion. By taking advantage of the darkness and the snowstorm, the III battalion worked its way even closer to a locality. The moving force of the armored group during the dawn was delayed by the fact that the Ford tanks ran into mines along the edge of the woods which first had to be -14- cleared. In the meantime, the III battalion broke into locality in Fought head from house to house. The locality was stubbornly defended by enemy tanks. Individual combat teams for then stopped by enemy tanks and were temporarily taken into captivity, even the battalion commander. It was not until the attack all lunging from the edge of the woods of on a broad front was made that the locality was taken in this situation restored. The III battalion had considerable losses, especially in as much as enemy tanks concentrated fire at close range on the many wounded men who were in several sellers. At about noon SARD-LEZ-ST VITH was fully cleared and in our firm possession. In toto, about 20 American tanks for put out of action or captured, the number was abandoned and was still completely intact and about 50 prisoners were taken. During the day, and during the following night, the locale the itself was under constant enemy artillery fire. In the direction of St. Vincent, contact was made with the 18 and 62 VGD. During the afternoon, the units were put in order and the many tanks that were had struck fast for pulled out. During the night, the II battalion, which was able to block a road leading to the VIELSALM only temporarily, was brought in the change of position of the artillery was carried out. The abandoned vehicles of the brigade had to be drawn along the way of ST VITH during the night because the roads leading from BORN and to SARD-LEZ-ST VITH were not passable. 23 December 44 At about 0800 of December 23, 1944, the brigade set out with the Harvard group by way of BIRKELER toward HINTERHAUSEN. In this locality several -15- enemy tanks responded, apparently regards. HINTERHAUSEN was taken with the loss of two of our tanks. Four enemy tanks for shot out of action. The further Vance on a broad front on both sides of the KAPELLENBUSCH towards KAPELLE led to the capture of More tanks which had got stuck in the marshy area east of KAPELLE. During the advance still more tanks which had not which had got stock fell into our hands. In order to take advantage of the success and in order to prevent the enemy from effecting a lodgment, the mobile II battalion was brought up and it took over the advance guard point after having been given an assault gun company. It immediately went on to ROGERY by way of FM KRETOLZ-COMMANSTER, whilst the armored group assembled and organized itself behind the artillery Battalion, which was following the II battalion. BEHO was free of enemy forces. Road conditions from the COMMANSTER ROGERY were understandably bad. Despite that fact, the direct road was ordered because the bridge one km northeast of BEHO was destroyed. East of ROGERY, enemy entrenchments were reported. For this reason, the artillery battalion was ordered into a position west of COMMANSTER for the purpose of guarding the advance. After Reese short struggle before darkness, ROGERY was taken, one hour later, cero. Week enemy artillery harassing fire was directed against both localities. I ordered the prompt continuation of the march in a westerly direction of the main road. Next March objective: the road crossing 3.5 camp west of REGENE’. During the entire day, I did not receive any report of all cancer in the enemy situation and location of the adjacent units. -16- the advance guard. Reported enemy column traffic in a northerly direction on the road from the BEOVIEGNY to SALMCHATEAU. I ordered the blocking of the road to the south, South the mill at CIERREUX in details to follow just behind the enemy columns in order to gain as much ground as possible without fighting in this manner. However, this following was soon notice and resulted in the fact that the tank at the end of open fire. I myself witnessed how the to advance so assault guns, one after another, put five enemy tanks into coupled guns out of action one after another by driving 50 m ahead each time in shooting off peace ground signal in such a manner that the enemy tank was completely lighted up each time and could be destroyed with the first shot, in the majority of cases. Because the enemy, and was apparently stopped by the demolition of the bridge, about 12 tanks and 20 vehicles could be captured in addition. The crew scattered into the train during the darkness. 24 Dec 44 The advance continued by way of PROVEDROUX, OTTRE and BIHAIN. At the break of the day the brigade was located about in the area mentioned above. The reaching of this high terrain was difficult for the tanks and vehicles as a result of the icy roads because the winter equipment requested had not arrive. I was very much astonished to meet up already with SS units in this area. A further movement during the day was not possible because of enemy air activities, which were increasing because of weather conditions. -17- temporary subordination to the sixth SS panzer Army The brigade was temporarily subordinated to the sixth SS army. A thrust in a northerly direction by way of LIERNEUX was intended. I want to leave this attack astride the road from REGNE’ to LIERNEUX (by-passing the latter locality to the right) and to reach the road in the direction of HABIEMONT by way of LANSIBAL. To this end, I secured REGNE’ for myself with a week are group. Reconnaissance in force thrust ahead toward FRAITURE. 25 Dec 44 Subordinated to the LVIII Korps Shortly before the beginning of this thrust, I received the order from here sector but to reach a MONIENES by way of SAMREE and DOCHAMPS at the onset of darkness in order to put the brigade at the disposal of the LVIII Panzer Korps. This order was changed at the time of the departure and an advance of the brigade in the direction of HAMPTEAU by way of SAMREE’ and LAROCHE was ordered. The Ia of the brigade, traveling to head toward WARIZY to the LVIII korps was guided in there. The Fuehrer-Begleit-Brigade was supposed to take the HOTTON and the bridge during the 26 Dec 44 and to attack further in the direction of NOISEAUX. To this end, the various units of the brigade received individual orders for the march into the assembly area see sketch and specifically at approximately in the order of the attack planned for the following day. It was important in this connection to clear the road as soon as possible in order that units coming up to travel into their respective assembly areas, if at all possible, in order to save time. Above all, it -18- was important to get the III battalion, which had been divided up onto all kinds of vehicles and which had already left its bicycles behind in born, of four during the night. The plan of attack was following: The II battalion was to attack to the right along road from RENDEUX-BAS to HAMPTEUX with the support of an assault gun company and to take the locality. The I II battalion was to for thrust to left through the BOIS DE HAMPTEUX and to take possession of the heights west of HAMPTEUX. The armored group, at the disposal of the brigade in RENDEUX-BAS, was, after the success of the initial phase of the attack, to thrust through, by way of HAMPTEUX, either along the road or further on to HOTTON between HAMPTEUX and MENIL, according to a situation and terrain, in order to take possession of this locality [HOTTON] and the crossing site. The artillery battalion was to go into position in such a manner that it to support the various phases of battle by means of observe fire in very close coordination with the individual combat teams. The bulk of the antiaircraft regiment was employed for air defense because there was no possibility of Artillery effect for the heavy anti-aircraft battalion on account of its flat trajectory. During the progress of the attack, elements of the antiaircraft regiment were to eliminate enemy flanking pressure from the northern flank northern bank of the zero arty, especially in the area of WERPIN, and to keep themselves in readiness after the capture of HOTTON in order to be used to block the road of approach. 26 DEC 44 -19- the first elements of the brigade arrived in the assembly area about midnight. At of 930 ending of the Assembly and beginning of the attack. Despite the extremely difficult terrain, the attack was successful. Will's the battalion the right to the BOIS DE HAMPTEUX [sic!] the battalion to less thrust through the BOIS DE HAMPTEUX. I have already given the order to move ahead to the armored group when the court gave me the ordered to suspend the attack it once and to disengage the brigade for the purpose of another assignment. My protest to the effect of this would be possible during the day only at the price of heavy losses at this stage of the battle was rejected twice. The cessation of the attack and the disengagement from the enemy was ordered. This engagement cost quite a few losses because the enemy went over to the attack at once. Week elements of the 116 panzer grenadier division took over the protection of a line of departure. At the onset of darkness, the first element of the Brigade or on the march by way of HALLEUX, BEUCHEMPAY(?), the intersection of the roads [lit., “road spiderâ€] west of the CHAMPLON and ORTHEUVILLE. Motor fuel was so scarce that almost half of the vehicles had to be towed. 27 DEC 44 Considering the enemy air activities, the brigade was supposed to take shelter for the day in the BOISE DE HERBAINONT. The medical company, traveling during the day, was shot up in flames the extent of 40% by a fighter-bomber attack lasting 35 minutes, although all vehicles are painted white and bore the Red Cross. The number of wounded men were thereby killed. During the course of the night, the brigade was to take -20- over the sector of the 26 Volks Gren Div, which was located approximately in the line from MORHET to SIBRET. It was the intention of higher headquarters to use the Brigade for the purpose of closing the broken ring of encirclement around Bastogne by means of attack in a southerly direction in order to close this gap again. The personally found out that the 26 Volks Gren Div was very weak and was without armor piercing weapons. It would therefore have to be taken into account that would be pressed back even further to the north during the day. Terrain reconnaissance showed, moreover that the sector from PINSAMONT to HOUMONT and the high terrain south of CHENOGNE any would have to be held under all circumstances if the conditions for attack to the south were to remain favorable. I therefore decided to commit a 105mm antiaircraft battery and a light anti-aircraft battery at once in the area of CHENOGNE in such a manner that they could command the higher terrain west and south of this locality in order to prevent the enemy tank penetration. Likewise ordered the armored personnel carrier battalion with several assault guns, which was traveling in a great distance between units, because of the danger from the air to proceed into the BOIS DE VALET. The bulk of the antiaircraft regiment was committed for the air defense around TRONLE and west of FLAMIERGE. This measure proved good because during the course of the afternoon 10 cargo carrying gliders, committed for the purpose of bringing supplies to Bastogne, could be shot down. SIBROT was lost during the course of the day, as was expected. CHENOGNE was likewise temporarily lost because it was taken right back again in a counter thrust by elements of the Brigade located in the BOIS -21- DE VALET. During the morning the artillery battalion took a firing positions in the area of FLAMIERGE. Brigade command post and TRONLE. 28 Dec 44 During the night, the brigade was assembled, according to orders, in the area of CHENOGNE in need for the attack against SIBRET and, together with the II battalion, took over the guarding of the sector from the southern edge of the forest north of MAGEROTE to MAGERY to LAVASELLE to the sector south and south east of BRUL. Formation shown on the sketch. According to the expectations, the attack launched during the morning did not get very far beyond the patch of woods one km south of CHENOGNE because the brigade was the only attacking unit area, against which the unit the entire enemy artillery and anti-aircraft fire of the enemy forces located in south of SIBRET was concentrated. The flanking fire from VILLEROUX had especially unpleasant effect. A little later, the enemy forces located in the area of SIBRET went over to the attack. Hard fighting went on during the entire day, during which the patch of woods south of CHENOGNE changed hands a number of times during this fighting a 105mm antiaircraft gun distinguished itself especially. During the entire day, this gun and its crew put enemy tanks at action, which were under heavy fire, and very close range along the southern edge of this patch of woods. The crew of the gun defended the gun in close infantry combat. It was not until 30 Dec 44 that this gun was rammed by an enemy tank while fighting. That evening the Brigade reported that it was too weak to be able to carry out the attack order against SIBRET alone and that -22- a concentrated artillery support it on our part would be, at least, necessary to eliminate the enemy artillery. I was also especially bothered by the BOIS DE HAIES DE MAGERY, which had only been blocked hastily by an engineer company [26 VGD] under my command with roadblocks and a few minds. I knew that only weak forces of the adjacent unit on my right, the 3 Pz Gren Div, had arrived. 29 Dec 44 The 29 Dec 44 was characterized by repeated enemy attacks on CHENOGNE from a southerly and southwesterly direction which was carried forward with a strong Artillery support. Penetrations which often got as far as a locale they were mopped up by counter thrust. At evening, the situation was about the same as that of the previous day. During the night, very bravely and skillfully carried out reconnaissance as far as into the patches of forest south and southwest of SIBRET reported the assembly of tanks and vehicles. The brigade calculated that 30 Dec 44 would bring rather strong enemy attacks supported by tanks. Nevertheless, a renewed attack by the 3 Pz Gren div and the brigade in a southerly direction was ordered for 30 Dec 44. Specifically, the 3 Pz Gren Div was supposed to take VILLEROUX and to thrust onto ASSENOIS in order to affect a closing of the ring of encirclement around BASTOGNE and there with the I SS Pz Div. The Fuehrer-Begleit-brigade, subordinated to the 3 Pz Gren div, was to take SIBRET. (Subordinated to the 3 Pz Gren Division) And then to block off the road south of SIBRET leading onto Bastogne -23- to the west. For the brigade, this attack had the disadvantage that, firstly, it meant a repetition of the attack attempted on 28 DEC 44 and would therefore have to meet up against a strengthen the defense and, secondly, that no notable artillery support of any kind could be promise to me besides that of my own battalion. In addition, the III Battalion, which was still located in the old line of security, was not my disposal for this attack. Only an elimination of the flanking pressure from VILLEROUX the row was to be counted on. The plan of attack (see sketch) was as follows: After the assembly had been completed during the night in the area of CHENOGNE, The II Battalion, together with an assault gun company, was to attack and take SIBRET from the northwest, was the woods south of CHENOGNE (circumventing this woods because of enemy artillery fire) with the right wing pressed along the BRUL sector and thereby open the crossings on the northern edge of SIBRET for the armored group thrusting afterwards. The armored group(armored battalion and mounted armored personnel carrier battalion) was to divide itself near FLOHAMONT and if necessary to support the attack of the II battalion on both sides of the BRUL Brook and then, however, to thrust through SIBRET in order to block the road leading from the stone to the southwest in the region of BELLE-EAU to the west and likewise the road leading to CLOCHIMONT. The gap arising between MANDE ST MARI E and SIBRET during the course of the attack was to be stopped up by assault gun battery and a light anti-aircraft battery. The artillery Battalion, which had previously been committed in the area of FLAMIERGE, changed its position -24- into the hollow south east of RECHRIVAL and was to support the attack with its foreign observers accompanying both combat teams by observed fire on SIBRET. No artillery preparation, but rather fire after the beginning of the attack on request. The battalion had already adjusted its fire on SIBRET. The heavy anti-aircraft Italian was likewise support the attack on SIBRET with airbursts and to combat targets which present themselves on the right flank. ( in addition, the heavy anti-aircraft battalion actually had the assignment of putting tanks out of action which had broken through in a sort of antitank position. ) The III battalion was to go on defending itself in the same sector as previously. A light anti-aircraft Anti-Tank battery was subordinated. An assault gun battery was kept back from the brigade in order to be committed with the III battalion in case of an enemy tank attack. The heavy infantry gun battery likewise had observation posts with the III battalion. 30 DEC 44 The attack was set for 0730 in order to steal the march on the enemy attack to be expected. According to experience, the enemy never attacked before 0900. The II Battalion, located in an advanced position, had, shortly before, captured the enemy security detachment just ahead of it (half way between CHENOGNE and FLOHAMONT). Forward brigade command post south of CHENOGE. Brigade command at RENUAMONT. At the break of daylight, the II Battalion started out, will stop the armored group expanded toward the south, gaining ground south of CHENOGE. For the time being, the II battalion made good progress, however it gets stuck on the BRUL ditch just before SIBRET in infantry -25- Fire and well-placed artillery fire from SIBRET. The brave commander (Oakley cluster bearer, Major Mikley) was so badly wounded it that he died a short time later when he tried to pull his battalion forward again. (The commander of the I battalion was likewise put out of action by a traffic (?) during the previous night). As the fog lifted, the armored group, which was advancing on to FLOHAMONT, recognized two armored groups of about 30 tanks each advancing to the north. As far as I recall, the one was located in the area of MORHET, while the other was traveling in the direction of JODENVILLE. The armored group of the Brigade opened fire at once and put a number tanks at of action at once. Because it to our group was located on a slope and was very soon under heavy tank fire and concentrated, well-placed artillery fire, it disengage itself from the enemy, taking the II battalion with it, and continued to carry on the tank battle provide terrain between MAND ST MARIE and the patch of woods to the east, including the latter. The II Battalion, disengaging itself, alas, among the tanks(rather than to the side), at considerable losses. Four of our tanks were thereby put out of action. This tank battle, led inexorably on both sides, lasted about two to three hours. I learned from an estimation of situation that our attack had been started at the same time as a very strong enemy attack, which apparently was supposed to lead to a retirement of our divisions fighting toward the west. The reinforced, concentrated enemy artillery fire, as well as a continuous bombing attacks and fighter-bomber attacks also indicated this. -26- I myself had thus far been with the armored group. When I noticed that an enemy task force was advancing to the north by way of LAVASELLE in the direction of RECHRIVAL, i.e., in the direction of our portly man line of security, I immediately drove with my command armored personnel carrier at through the BOIS DE VALLET to RANUAMONT, whether my Brigade staff had moved during the morning. During a short assessed discussion about commitment with my eye A, the first enemy tank already drove past my house, while the second covered at the church in HUBERMONT. The first was wiped out by an anti-tank grenade, while the second was forced to turn away to the south by fire. The assault gun company, which was still available, together with a few netted grenadiers, was sent out from MILLOMONT toward the southwest in order to block the road south of RECHRIVAL and likewise the sector between this road and the Bois de ballet. The artillery battalion located southeast of RECHRIVAL defended itself stubbornly with direct fire against attacking tanks. Three enemy tanks were thereby put that action. The successful assault gun company in the antiaircraft guns located on the edge of the body of a lag enabled the formation of a strong point light front by the II battalion by way of the southern edge of GERIMONT, ACUL, the hills south east of RECHRIVAL and the southern edge of the northwestern extension of the BOIS DE VALLET. What I believe the danger point in the sector to have been cleared up, I drew back again to CHENOGNE. In the meantime, that locality had been turned into a pile of stones by continuous bombing attacks in concentrated artillery fire. I had just arrived in the southern most -27- House when a strong enemy tank attack by way of MANDE-ST MARIE against CHENOGNE, with flanking pressure against the northern hollow, was carried out. Because I encountered only a few of our damaged tanks and a few grenadiers' in the locality itself, which had affected a lodgment in the cellars in ruins of the locality, I considered the situation extremely critical. I was paralyzed myself for quite some time, as far as commanding was concerned, because an enemy tanks stopped a few meters from my house. It was nevertheless possible to send off to radio messages from the command armored personnel carrier, which was located in the dead space of the House. These messages were sent to the armored group: locality to be held to last man and the request for support to be sent to the 3 Pz Gren Div. I wondered why and the enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers, which were manned by crews, did not take a locality, although they were hardly fired upon and all from the locality. As I later found out, are armored group had taken up the tank battle, standing around CHENOGNE in a semicircle and skillfully taking advantage of the terrain, because of the previous continuous bombing attacks on the locality, what the same time the tanks located on the northern edge of the woods south of CHENOGNE, as well as the heavy anti-aircraft battery located on the southern edge of the BOIS DE VALLET, were very effective. This battle is one of the toughest that the brigade experienced during the Ardennes offensive. The attack was repelled during the afternoon and CHENOGNE remained in our possession. In my opinion, the locality could have been taken by dismounted infantry company because a locality itself was -28- hardly occupied. Our losses of men during the day were heavy, because the brigade had to organize itself for the defense from attack position under strong enemy pressure. Nevertheless, this day lead to the to the complete Defenses success to the will to fight in the bravery of the German soldier. This success resulted in the enemy is losing about 30 tanks. In my opinion, the enemy attack was set too rigidly against. It would no doubt have been had more success if the point of main effort of the attack had been with the combat Team advancing on RECHRIVAL, because this combat Team at practically thrust through the defense of the brigade near RECHRIVAL with its advance guard point while the bulk of the brigade was tied up in the battle around CHENOGNE. In addition, there was the fact that, as so often, the brigade was given time during the night to form a new defensive front without any disturbance. The oft-said sentence: “Lord let the evening come, then is the battle won,†proved true, even in this critical situation. The American force could have saved a lot of blood if had continued to exploit the success is of the day during the night. This and the proverbial dread of fighting in the woods were to certain factors which could be taken into account in formulating tactical measures. Both were things which astonished us Eastern-front warriors vary greatly. The evening report of the brigade to 3 Panzer Gren Div expressed the fact that a repetition of attack on SIBRET could not be made with the means at our disposal, and that, on the other hand, all the forces the brigade would have to be concentrated in order to be able to -29- hold the front in case of further enemy attacks. 31 DEC 44 Subordinated to the XLVII Panzer Korps During the night, the brigade was regrouped (see sketch). The three P's the Grand Division took over CHENOGNE. The boundary line ran about as follows: from the road crossing south of the BOIS DE HERBAIMONT to the eastern edge of RENUAMONT to the western edge of the BOIS DE VALLET to FLOHAMONT. Left boundary with the panzer layer Division: western edge of LAVACHERIE to the road fork east of the I ROMPRE to REMAGNE, not including the last. Because all three battalions were equally exhausted from fighting in the relief of the badly hit II battalion could no longer be achieved on time, the decided to leave the front from GERIMONT to NISUAMONT to RECHRIVAL to the western tip of the BOIS DE VALLET, which was occupied only as a series of strong points, in its present grouping, despite the attack expected on the next day. The II battalion was reinforced with about 100 men. To this end, I credit for myself too strong tactical reserves with the mission of clearing up possible enemy penetrations by immediate counter thrust. For this purpose, the I battalion Anti-Tank Battalion were considered for the Eastern are RECHRIVAL sector, the sector including the point of main effort, and the II battalion and the assault gun battalion for the western sector. A heavy anti-aircraft battery was committed in the patches of woods north of REMUAMONT for a defense against enemy tanks which might break through to the north onto the main road. The heavy anti-aircraft battery committed in the area north of SPRIMONT was likewise ordered into such a position that it could fire on enemy tanks that had made penetrations, in addition to its air defense. -30- The II battalion was to send forth continuous reconnaissance in force in the direction of REMAGNE and into the BOIS DES HAIES DE MAGERY. Brigade command post and LAVASELLE, the forward command post near the armored group in FOSSET. The relief in CHENOGNE was not ended until daylight. Enemy forces affecting a temporary penetration were turned back by tanks that were already advancing. During the course of the day, a number of attacks, which did not have the force of attacks on RECHRIVAL and PINSAMONT on the previous day, were repelled by the brave III battalion and by concentrated artillery fire. 1 JAN 45 During the night, the II battalion took over the sector from GERIMONT to PINSAMONT, together with the tactical reserve end TILLET, to which a battery of the assault gun battalion was brought up from AUDERLOUP. Reconnaissance in force the southeast was ordered sent out from TILLET. The III battalion was reinforced by the company located in PINSAMONT. The extremely critical motor fuel situation (During the following day, the tanks had only enough motor fuel for a distance of 15 to 20 km at a times ) compelled the armored vehicles to keep close together. After counter thrusts had taken place, the tanks often had to be left up front in order not to use up motor fuel unnecessarily. All vehicles which were not combat vehicles were parked north of CURTHE. After 0900, the enemy attack continuously with could tank support. Several enemy tanks which had broken into HUBERMONT and RECHRIVAL were put out of action in close combat by the brave men of the II battalion. -31- More tanks (about 8 ) were put out of action by the antiaircraft battery located in the patches of woods northeast of RENUAMONT. In HUBERMONT, the brave commander of the II battalion was killed in close combat. The toughly in except inexorably lead battle of this battalion, which had been facing the enemy without interruption since 19 Dec 44, created favorable conditions for the participation of the armored group, which through the enemy back into the jump-off positions. PINSAMONT was lost. The company that was thrown out of that locale the belonging to the II battalion took up the fight anew on the ridge between ACUL and RECHARIVAL with its front to the southeast. A counter-thrust did not take place because PISAMONT was located far out from the General course of the front. A weak attack on GERIMONT was repelled. In the sector of the adjacent unit to left, CHENOGNE was lost at one o’clock. As a result, the left wing of the II battalion was withdrawn in the evening hours to the hills south of MILLOMONT. 2 Jan 45 The withdrawal of the badly battered III battalion and its relief by the I battalion was ordered for the night. The III battalion was supposed to rest up in AMBERLOUP in order to occupy the right sector of the brigade, the southern part of the BOIS LA CHENAIE, on the following morning. By doing this, I wanted have the left sector of the brigade defended by the II Battalion, which was the most powerful. I knowingly forewent a rather strong tactical reserve commanded by the brigade in doing so, but ordered all Battalions to set aside at least 1/3 of their fighting strength as local reserves for immediate counter thrust. A -32- part of the armored group was also committed within the framework of the I battalion in such a manner that enemy tanks could be put out of action even before reaching the main line of resistance. In order to save blood, the heavy weapons thus became the mainstays of the defensive battle. At this time, the battalion had a fighting strength of about 150 men. Generally speaking, the rifle companies were 25 to 30 men strong during the course of the day all attacks on the left were successfully repelled without the occurrence of any penetrations. Several enemy tanks for put out of action north of the BOIS DE VALLET. In the case of the II Battalion, GERIMONT was lost after a second attack. A further advance to the north was averted by the participation of an assault gun company. 3 Jan 45 On 3 Jan 45, no attacks worthy of mention took place. After 1000, the III battalion was in the position ordered. During the night, the expose elements of the II battalion in ACUL were withdrawn to CHENOGNE. The rumble of motors reported south of RECHRIVAL and the night was enter carpeted as the preparation of attack for the following day. ( relief of the 11th armored Division( US) by the seven Airborne Division). At evening, the brigade had about 25 tanks and assault guns ready for action, 15 in repair, and about 15 to 20 tanks which were located on our road of advance, for the most part, with mechanical damages. The bulk of them could not be towed off as yet because no motor fuel was available for that purpose 4 Jan 45 On 4 Jan 45, there was only enemy patrol activity in the right -33- sector of the brigade. To the left, there was the successful defense against several attacks against HUBERMONT by means of antitank fire from the heavy anti-aircraft battery located in the patches of woods northeast of RENUAMONT. Taking into consideration the temporary enemy penetration in FLAMIERGE in the case of the adjacent unit to left, our own left flank was covered. Furthermore, and assault gun battery was temporarily given to the 3 Pz Gren Division. The antiaircraft battery mentioned above, which is known to have been under continuous enemy artillery fire, change position during the evening to the region of the southern edge of the BOIS DE HERBAIMONT. The Brigade command post was moved, according to orders, to ROUMONT. The forward command post remained in FOSSET. 5 Jan 45 On 5 Jan 45, an attack was made in the right sector on the III battalion. After all attacks had been repel during the day, the two companies located in the southern part of the BOIS LA CHENAMIL were captured, with about 60 men, during the evening hours. Only a few M.G. bursts were heard in the position was later found empty. Apparently, these companies had been attacked from the rear. Remains enigmatic why the enemy did not march further to the north through the forest. He could have hardly met up against any resistance there. In this connection, it must be said that the enemy forces (in this case, the 87 Inf Div (US) fought very skillfully, as far as infantry was concerned. It was the only force for which we had respect, even during the night. In the area of TILLET, patrols were encountered behind our lines which shouted to our post, relief detachments, etc. in -34- German and thereby cause so many a surprise. 6 Jan 45 During the day, a number of attacks were made on TILLET in the sector of the II Battalion, the locality was held and hard fighting. East of TILLET, the enemy was able to gain several hundred meters. The brigade forewent counter thrusts south of the road from TILLET to LAVALLE, taking into consideration the enemy artillery superiority in fighter bomber attacks, which shattered every movement during the day in the open terrain. On the other hand, enemy forces which had temporarily advanced in TILLET and across the road from TILLET to LAVALLE were thrown back by counter thrust. In order to save blood, the brigade ordered the II battalion, which was located in the open terrain, to take up reverse-slope positions if possible, in order to break up enemy attacks in front of our main line resistance by the fire of heavy weapons from the low ground. This also had the advantage that the enemy artillery could not hit our forward lines with observed fire. The experience of the last several days have shown that the enemy did not begin his attacks, as a rule, until after a rather long artillery preparation. Then, if the attack following it ran up against resistance, it was broken off at once. Then an artillery preparation began again, followed by an infantry attack. That was repeated a number of times during the day. It was not until almost no resistance took place from the MLR (main line of resistance) it that the enemy infantry went forward. Paralysis of our heavy weapons, especially of the artillery, was hardly brought about, however, except temporarily bite fighter-bombers. In view of -35- Shortage of ammunition of our artillery, the enemy infantry was supposed to be repelled with heavy losses by a battle from a reverse-slope position with Infantry and machine gun fire commencing suddenly at the last moment. The prerequisite for such a conduct of battle is, naturally, that the heavy weapons, especially the artillery, have good possibilities for observation into the terrain ahead from commanding points in the rear terrain. Moreover, the command of the brigade was struck by the fact, during the last several days, that the enemy attacks were led in quite disorganized manner in suspect to time in place. For the most part, the sector of only one battalion was attacked. The explanation for this fact was to be found in the statements from prisoners of war, from which it was learned that the brigade had to enemy decisions before it which war apparently not under one command. 7 Jan 45 The 7 Jan 45 was again a very difficult day for the brigade. TILLET and the sector from RECHRIVAL to HUBERMONT to MILLOMONT were alternately attack. The attacks are again introduced by strong artillery and fighter-bombers attacks. All attacks on TILET and to the east of that locality were readily repelled. Toward evening, the enemy succeeded in penetrating into MILLOMONT from a southeasterly direction. In RENUAMONT, into which the enemy thrust immediately thereafter, a weak company about 20 men was put together and was on two farms. Although surrounded and repeatedly attacked, it was still fighting stubbornly and bravely at 0300. The entire armored group was in combat -36- And did have any more reserves at all. A company of about 25 men, which was quickly thrown together by the brigade, was set out during the night for the purpose of counterattacking. A detachment of the small unit, thrusting through the middle of the village, which was occupied by the enemy, succeeded in blocking off the village to the rear in an energetic night attack, while the rest of the company took one house after another, thereby relieving the company which was bravely holding out. Moreover, about a hundred and 40 prisoners were brought in. Despite the fact that the unshaken young company commander lost his right hand in close combat at the beginning, he led this undertaking to a full success in did not take leave from the Brigade until the following morning. Apparently, this nocturnal attack must have caused a very great panic, because we were able to occupy HUBERMONT and MILLOMONT again almost without a fight. Taking the contact with the adjacent unit to the left into consideration, Korps permitted the MLR to be moved to a line from the southern edge of RENUAMONT to RECHIMONT to the southern edge of the patch of woods west of RECHIMONT. Weak outposts were left in from LAVALLE to HUBERMONT to MILLOMONT. This position meant a shortening of front and had better possibilities of the effect into the terrain ahead. 8 Jan 45 On a Jan 45, unsuccessful attacks are made on TILLET and positions east of it. In the area from MILLOMONT to HUBERMONT, only weak enemy scatting rates. A heavy anti-aircraft battery went into such a position north of OURTHE for the support of the artillery -37- Battalion, which was suffering from a lack of ammunition, that its artillery could fire into the area of the II battalion. 9 Jan 45 On 9 Jan 45, no attacks in the sector of the I and II Battalions. In the case of the III Battalion, the situation demanded a withdrawal of the front to the road from PIROMPRE to TILLET. ( reasons no longer remembered. ) during the night, the fighting strength of the rifle companies were brought up to 30 men, those of the heavy weapons companies to 80 men. Brigade found out that a withdrawal of the front was planned. The following lines are required and, according to orders, were improved by supply personnel that moved up: 1) TONNY to the southern edge of AMBERLOUP to FOSSET and toward MACRAVIVIER. 2) The hill northeast of the RAU sector to the road forked act the southern tip of the BOI SE DE HERBAIMONT. 10 Jan 45 Renewed attack on TILLET. During the evening, the locality was lost after a tough battle. In view of the withdrawal plan, no counter-attack was ordered. No attacks at all and the other sectors. 11 Jan 45 No special happenings. During the night, the brigade disengage itself from the enemy without interference and reached the area around WIMBAY to CENS to BERGUEME. The sky battalion occupied the line from east of LAVACHERIE to AVISCOURT to the road forks south of the BOIS DE HERBAIMONT with a few tanks. -38- During the night of 11/12 Jan 45, the brigade was released from the XLVII Pz korps and became an Army reserve. /S/ Remer | |||||
| 373rd engineers company E | 19 Relevance | 14 years ago | MikeBruner | LOOKING FOR... | |
| My Dad was a member of the 373rd engineers company "E". I am looking for any information/contacts to help me learn more about his WW II experience. I know he was in LeHavre France from 21 SEP 44 to 25 NOV 44 clearing mines, debris etc. He has been gone for 23 years but as a veteran myself I have a passion to learn more about his experience. Any information or direction is greatly appreciated! | |||||
| 373rd Engineers | 26 Relevance | 15 years ago | Frey'son | INTRODUCE YOURSELF | |
| Father was Joseph Hardy, he was in the 373rd General Services Regiment, Company E. Time frame was from formation (circa 1943 to 1946) Looking to find, share any info with others My father was in the same company "E" he spoke often of Col. Bell. I will upload the pictures I have, once I have figured out this website. Father is Robert G. Frey. | |||||
| Company A, 359TH Engineer General Service Regiment | 22 Relevance | 15 years ago | Anonymous | LOOKING FOR... | |
| I'm digging. FIRST there's robert's link on this site, in the same Unit and COMPANY as your dad ============================== Army Services Corp Southern Base Engineer Group 2 was formed in the European Theatre of Operations on August 1, 1943. The units were as follows: 332nd Engineer General Service Regiment 333rd Engineer Special Service Regiment 354th Engineer General Service Regiment 437th Engineer Maintenance Company 416th Engineer Dump Truck Company 419th Engineer Dump Truck Company 517th Engineer Dump Truck Company 518th Engineer Dump Truck Company 389th Engineer Battalion (separated unit) 359th Engineer General Service Regiment 1302nd Engineer General Service Regiment 1278th Engineer Combat Battalion 204th Rngineer Combat Battalion 300th Engineer Combat Battalion ======= 359th XO'd by Colonel Edwin J Withers, U.S. Army: Chief, Troops Division near Reims, France and Executive Officer 359th Engineer General Service Regiment. (end of 44 and into 45) 359 constructed pipelines, storage tanks, and pumping stations for fuel from beaches to Paris after D-Day. The 359th was the largest unit in this operation. ================= 1942 were used to fight the white river flood in Arkansas ============= Possible patch/insignia ================================ there is a 359 engineer regiment book. It is out there somewhere. You might want to write to the US Army records is FT LenWood, and in PA for histories. ================================= It's a start! Happy hunting and welcome! | |||||
| 393rd Special Services/General Services | 22 Relevance | 16 years ago | kkopacki | LOOKING FOR... | |
| Here is the crest on EBAY today, which correctly associates it with the 393rd Engineer Bn, which matches the insignia I shared above. I also found the one which says new, so this is a later reproduction. It states it is new and is part of a commemoration package. Those started turning up on ebay last week. | |||||
| photo of 343rd bridge over Durance River | 19 Relevance | 9 years ago | Walts Daughter | WWII ENGINEERS | |
| My friend, and veteran Jim Davis, called me this week for more info on this bridge. Sent him what I had, including the journal entries from Armonde's page. I also found this today and thought I would include it. Railroads Allied rail supply operations in southern France began on 23 August with short-haul bulk service lines out of Frejus to points less than thirty miles inland. The 40th Engineer Beach Group had begun collecting empty rail cars at St. Tropez on D plus 2 and added this equipment to the twelve locomotives and eighty cars found intact at Carnoules, within the beachhead area. As Coastal Base Section took over Marseille, the Army engineers retained responsibility for roads and rail maintenance out of the city. Damage to roads was slight, and the rails were usually only blocked by fallen debris. Where Germans had torn up trackage, French railroad employees replaced rails and ties with no difficulty. From a point above Aix-en-Provence, twenty-five miles north of Marseille, the French rail net divided into two routes traveling north: a multiple track link running up the Rhone valley on both sides of the river and a single track branching east and then north to Grenoble. More steeply graded, negotiating mountain terrain, and subject to deep snows and frequent flooding, in the upland passes, the Grenoble route nevertheless had priority because there seemed to be far less damage along it than along the heavier duty Rhone alternate. The major breaks encountered in the southern end of the net were just southwest of Aix; at Meyrargues, ten miles north of Aix; and north of Sisteron at the confluence of the Buech and Durance Rivers. The original plan for railroad repair left the entire job of major rehabilitation behind the armies to the engineers of the 1st Military Railway Service, scheduled for phasing into southern France on D plus 30. When the advance up the Rhone valley got much ahead of schedule, bridge repair fell to the Seventh Army engineers, now forced to rely on their ingenuity and extensive stocks of locally procured materials. With heavy bridging steel sections still on convoys sailing from the United States or heading for Marseille from stockpiles within the Mediterranean, the engineers were working with a supply allotment adequate for D plus 14 operations when the combat elements had already taken D plus 60 objectives. General Davidson’s construction regiments picked up what they could to improvise structures to span German demolitions in the rail supply line. L-5 Cub planes gave the engineers a head start on surveying the damage. Engineer officers with Speed Graphic cameras flew low-level passes over blown bridges, some behind enemy lines, shooting oblique-angle photographs to give construction troops a means of computing their material requirements.24 The 343rd Engineer General Service Regiment restored service to Aix in ten days by a stratagem that saved days in repairing a 104-foot gap in the rail bridge. In the area the unit found a German 270-mm. railway gun. Hauling it to the site, the engineers stripped the gun and the rail trucks from the traverse base of the piece and, attaching a ten-foot steel extension, launched the platform as the stringers for the new span across the void, Bailey fashion. The Aix bridge work was complete on 29 August. At the same time engineers were restoring the bridge at Page 452 Meyrargues, a task made doubly troublesome by a rise in flood waters. After closing a 107-foot gap with the first Bailey railroad bridge in southern France, a quadruple-single span with a deck thirty-eight feet above the water’s surface, they opened the bridge to traffic on 18 September. The 40th Engineer Combat Regiment forged the last link in the rail chain on the eastern route. A Class 60 span covering two breaks over the Buech River north of Sisteron, the bridge used stocks of local lumber and steel sections. The engineers replaced a destroyed 91-foot-high central masonry pier with a vertically emplaced triple-single Bailey panel. Supply traffic, moving 1,500 tons per day over this point after 22 September, could travel to railheads in the Poligny–Mouchard area, 130 miles north of Grenoble, relieving some transport problems as the 6th Army Group crossed the Moselle River.25 When the director General of the Military Railway Service, Brig. Gen. Carl R. Gray, Jr., brought his headquarters from Rome to Lyon on 14 September, he immediately began a more complete reconnaissance of rail damage. He then revised original priorities, concentrating on the double-track system up the Rhone valley to Lyon. General Gray told General Devers four days later that the main breaks in this stretch were at Livron, Avignon, and Valence; two smaller rail bridges outside Lyon, one over the Rhone and one over the Saone River, would have to be reconverted from use as vehicular bridges. Save for material shortages, the breaks at Valence and Avignon posed no problems.26 The 343rd Engineer General Service Regiment, assigned the job of opening the Marseille-to-Lyon route, began work on the Livron bridge on 7 September. Where before the war a masonry-arch bridge had carried a single track across the shallow, muddy Drome, there was now a 310-foot break with all the masonry piles blown. The low height of the original structure and the river’s slow current lessened engineering problems; the troops emplaced scarce steel I-beam stringers atop nine timber bents to open the line to rail-borne supply on 20 September, five days ahead of General Gray’s estimates. This performance, together with the 343d’s operation in the southern Rhone valley, earned the regiment Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch’s commendation. On 2 October, the 344th Engineer General Service Regiment repaired a 410-foot single-track structure over the Doubs River at Dole, using thirty-foot-high timber bents, with standard Bailey forming the span. Opening the Dole route brought the railheads north to Vesoul and Besançon.27 At that point in the restoration, with railheads moving into the rear of the 6th Army Group area, German demolitions at the bridges had become the smaller supply problem. By mid-September General Devers found that where railroads were concerned, the “bottleneck now is cars rather than bridges.”28 Page 453 The Aix bridge, which used the carriage of a German railway gun When the Allied drive slowed against stiffening German resistance at the Vosges Mountains and the defenses before the Rhine River, supply lines stopped growing. But the demand for ammunition rose alarmingly, and shortages persisted until the winter months. Trucks remained the principal means of transport until well into October, when new railroad rolling stock arrived at Marseille; in September trucks carried forward 222,000 tons of supply compared to 63,000 tons moving by rail. Engineer units had built eighty-eight highway bridges on the supply routes, mostly from local timber and steel stock. After 30 October Seventh Army engineers divided responsibility for rail rehabilitation with the increasingly capable 1st Military Railway Service, whose units and equipment were now arriving more regularly. Army engineers reopened a northern loop in the rail service running from Epinal to Strasbourg through Blainville, Lunéville, and Sarrebourg, while the 1st Military Railway Service worked on a southern leg running from Epinal through St. Die to Strasbourg. The Military Railway Service refurbished the military rail line behind the First French Army on an axis running from Vesoul through Lure and Belfort to Mulhouse. In supporting the drive up the Rhone, the 1st Military Railway Service supervised the construction of forty-two rail bridges and the repair of nine between Marseille Page 454 and Dijon by early 1945. At various times, the work continued to involve the 40th, 94th, 343rd, 344th, and 540th Engineer Regiments and the 1051st Engineer Port Construction and Repair Group. With the winter lull in the advance, the engineers began to take up scarce Bailey panels laid down in the press of the rapid assault, replacing them with semi-permanent timber bent, steel, and wood deck bridging along vital roads and rail lines. During the last half of October the engineers consolidated the hoarded reserves for the thrust through the Siegfried Line, over the Rhine River and into Germany itself.29 | |||||
| The War is Over - America Celebrates | 19 Relevance | 18 years ago | Walts Daughter | THE HOME FRONT | |
| The end It was the end. It was the beginning. It was hope. At home and around the world, Americans celebrated like never before. By Eric Ethier Unbelievably, peace was finally coming to Europe. The world listened with joy at 3:00 p.m. on May 8, 1945, as British Prime Minister Winston Churchill confirmed that the German high command had met with Allied officials the previous morning and signed surrender papers. Churchill's familiar, grandfatherly voice crackled out across radio airwaves, "The German war therefore is at an end." Celebrations broke out across Europe, but the fall of Axis powers Italy and now Germany meant little in the Far East, where American forces were still grappling with Japan. Japanese General Jiro Minami declared that Japan was fighting for the "defense of the national polity of Imperial Japan and the security of the right for existence of the Asiatics." Japan, he asserted, never had "the slightest intention of relying on the power of Germany in prosecuting this sacred war." Persuading Japan's leaders to give up was not going to be easy. For nearly three years, while Allied armies dueled with their German counterparts in Europe, America's Pacific forces had been slowly driving Japanese forces out of territories Japan had captured early in the war. It was a brutal task. In the months following the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan had rampaged through the Pacific, swallowing up a huge area ranging northward from the Solomon Islands northeast of Australia to the tail of Alaska's Aleutian Islands. Before a direct retaliatory strike could be made on Japan, American servicemen would have to fight over every imaginable type of terrain across 2,000 miles of islands. Two months after the destruction of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's fleet at Midway (between Hawaii and Japan) in June 1942, American naval and marine forces began a two-pronged counterattack against Japan. One prong jutted into the South Pacific, landing US forces on the jungle-covered island of Guadalcanal. After six months of bitter fighting, Guadalcanal fell in February 1943. Allied forces led by General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral William Halsey subsequently continued on through the rest of the Solomons, Papua, and New Guinea, isolating and killing off Japan's major base at Rabaul, New Britain, by the spring of 1944. Meanwhile, the second prong thrust into the Central Pacific, where US naval forces under Admiral Chester Nimitz began the advance with an assault on the Gilbert Islands in November 1943. Next up were the Marshall Islands, which fell in February 1944, and the Marianas, secured by August. Each island taken tightened up American supply lines and provided ground for new airfields that allowed America's air forces to extend their range. Possession of the Marianas brought new American bombers far enough west to make possible the strategic bombing of Japan--the systematic destruction of the island nation's infrastructure and means of production. Meanwhile, Japan's defensive perimeter in the Pacific continued to collapse. By the spring of 1945, MacArthur had liberated the Philippines, and American marines had endured unbelievable conditions to capture Iwo Jima, a pitiless rock some 750 miles southeast of Japan. Now, as Allied soldiers and sailors and free people every where celebrated the defeat of Nazi Germany, American military planners prepared to take Okinawa, the largest of the Ryukyu Islands that lay just 380 miles south west of Japan's home islands. However defiant Japanese leaders might have remained, their country was being squeezed to death--by US forces in the Pacific, British and Chinese forces to the west, and Soviet forces that seemed likely to descend soon from the north. The Japanese realized that, once Okinawa fell, an American invasion of the home islands would come next. But for Japan, surrender was not an option. Her soldiers had undergone harsh, abusive training to eliminate thought of anything but doing their duty. "Fear not to die for the cause of everlasting justice," they had been told. "Do not stay alive in dishonor. Do not die in a way that will leave a bad name behind you." Japanese soldiers would fight until the end. This was the mindset of the soldiers American troops would have to meet on Okinawa, a sliver of land 60 miles long and 18 miles across at its widest point. Veteran marines had found the fighting more difficult with each Pacific island they assaulted. Increasingly desperate and fanatical Japanese defenders fought like tigers, especially on Iwo Jima, which tested the stomachs of even battle-hardened leathernecks. Aside from having value as an air base, that island was a worthless, hideous apparition of rock, volcanic sand, and--worst of all--reinforced caves, tunnels, and bomb-proof shelters that shielded its Japanese defenders from everything American ships and planes could fire at them. Bitter marines had to go in and root the Japanese out, paying the price for the captured ground in casualties and terrible memories. Taking the much larger Okinawa, which the Japanese had been fortifying for months, promised to be a worse nightmare. But that island offered the United States two excellent harbors, room for plenty of new airstrips, and an ideal launching point for the invasion of Japan, already scheduled to begin in the fall. As March 1945 ended, a massive American fleet of 40 aircraft carriers (including one British fast carrier group), 18 battleships, 200 destroyers, and hundreds of smaller ships and support craft converged on Okinawa. After marine reconnaissance, elements of the US Army's 77th Division overran a series of small islands off Okinawa's southwest coast, clearing away the few Japanese defenders there, destroying 350 suicide-attack boats, and opening the door for invasion. In the early hours of Easter Sunday, April 1, 1945, the dark skies above Okinawa lit up with the firing of nearly every big gun in the American fleet's massive offshore arsenal. The island had already absorbed a week of bombing and strafing. Now, before hundreds of landing craft and amphibious vehicles headed for shore, the battleships, cruisers, and destroyers of Admiral Raymond Spruance's Fifth Fleet unleashed all of their firepower on the ground above the eight-mile-wide landing zone, trying to ensure a safe landing for the Tenth Army of Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. Under Buckner--whose father had surrendered Fort Donelson, Tennessee, to Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant back in 1862--was the III Amphibious Corps (1st, 2nd, and 6th Marine divisions) and the army's XXIV Corps (7th, 27th, 77th, and 96th divisions), a total of 183,000 men. To everyone's amazement, the Tenth Army went ashore virtually unopposed and quickly moved inland. Okinawa was lightly populated in the north, where low-slung mountains dominated the land. Buckner's army would face its challenge in the south, where sloping hills and east-to-west ridges formed natural lines of defense. Eschewing the old Japanese strategy of confronting the enemy on the beach, Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima would ambush the invaders when they entered his lair--a fantastic, endless, interconnected maze of reinforced caves, catacombs, pillboxes, tunnels, redoubts, and other formidable shelters that combined to form a giant, solid sponge from which any of the 100,000 soldiers of his 32nd Army might emerge at any moment. The American navy's terrifying barrage had hardly scratched them. Only careful, cave-by-cave assaults with grenades, machine guns, satchel charges, and--where terrain permitted--flame-throwing tanks would drive out the dug-in Japanese. Knowing he could not win the battle, Ushijima's sole intent was to kill as many Americans as possible, depriving them of troops for the inevitable invasion of his homeland. Day one of the invasion seemed--and was--too easy. Roughly 50,000 troops went ashore, with the 6th and 1st Marine divisions and the army's 7th and 96th divisions (in order from left to right) heading east to divide the island. The 2nd Marine Division made a diversionary feint 40 miles south of the main landings, which it would repeat the following morning and then go into reserve at Saipan. The 6th Marines turned north and within three weeks swept the upper island clear of the enemy. Meanwhile, the infantry moved rapidly south towards Ushijima's outer perimeter and ran into a hornet's nest at Kakazu Ridge, a confusing and terrifying series of fortified heights crammed full of deadly surprises. In several days of brutal, nightmarish exchanges with the hidden enemy, the 7th and 96th divisions first took and then lost the heights, suffering about 3,000 casualties. The Americans managed to repulse several Japanese counterattacks April 12-14, killing nearly 1,600. On the 19th, Major General John Hodge sent the reformed XXIV Corps west to try to bypass deadly Kakazu Ridge and continue south. The maneuver failed, but following it up the next day, Hodge's legions gradually pierced the Japanese positions, finally forcing Ushijima to withdraw his dwindling forces to his next defensive ring. On May 3, Ushijima ordered a second counteroffensive that ended as miserably for him as the first: marines wiped out a small Japanese amphibious force on the west coast, while 7th Division GIs stopped a similar move on the east. Meanwhile, Japanese infantry hurled themselves at the American center, only to be cut down amid a hail of bullets and artillery shells. Now, a reconstituted American force--the 1st and 6th Marine divisions and the army's 77th and 96th (later replaced by the 7th) divisions--aligned west to east, prepared to roll south. Beginning on May 11, Buckner--who inexplicably refused to attempt amphibious flanking maneuvers--drove his army slowly but steadily toward Ushijima's second perimeter, the Shuri Line, yet another east-west series of ridges that the hands of time seemed to have formed specifically for an army on the defensive. While Ushijima played his deadly game of hide and seek with the wary American ground troops, Japan's air service flailed desperately at the ships around Okinawa. Japanese military planners had all but left the nation's defense in the hands of its Special Attack Corps--kamikazes, suicide boats, and divers trained to attack American ships as human bombs. Rear Admiral Toshiyuki Yokoi had at his disposal whatever planes and pilots could be spared from preparations for the defense of the home islands. Like Ushijima, Yokoi was determined to kill as many Americans and sink as many of their ships as possible, hoping to force more generous surrender terms and to deplete the resources available for the final invasion. The pride of the Special Attack Corps was the kamikaze, a mechanical version of a natural element that had once saved Japan. "Eight hundred years ago the Mongols attempted to invade Japan with a gigantic armada," one Japanese official explained, "but the flotillas were either destroyed or dispersed at sea by a sudden storm. That storm has been referred to as the Kamikaze or Divine Wind. Hence the name has been given to the Special Attack Corps that hurl their planes against the enemy." More simply, the kamikaze was a flying bomb, a fighter loaded with bombs deliberately flown into enemy ships. It was a desperate, crude, but terrifying weapon. First used during the Battle of Leyte Gulf in the Philippines in October 1944, kamikazes had startled American seamen, but thus far had done little harm. But the idea for a huge, organized Special Attack Corps took root, and Japanese propagandists went to work. One broadcast stated that kamikaze attacks had "bagged four of the enemy carriers" off Yap Island. Actually, only a small percentage of kamikazes scored hits at all, and most were on smaller picket ships that lacked the guns of the larger vessels. But bloated Japanese reports of kamikaze success drew great numbers of young pilots to the corps, eager for the adoration of their fellow citizens and to be part of the Divine Wind that would sweep away the enemy and save Japan. On April 6 and 7, more than 300 kamikazes struck the spread-out Allied fleet. The twisting and diving attackers managed to sink four destroyers, one transport, a minesweeper, and two ammunition ships, while damaging several other ships, including two carriers. But most of the attacking force did not return home, including the crew of the massive Battleship Yamato, which American planes sank on April 7. Waves of kamikazes would hurl themselves at the ubiquitous American and British ships 10 times before Okinawa fell in late June, braving virtual sheets of flying 5-inch, 40mm, and 20mm shells to sink 36 ships, damage 368, and terrorize thousands of mentally and physically spent seamen at a cost of 1,900 planes. American officials rejected the outrageous claims of Japan's navy minister, Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, who boasted that "about 50 per cent of the American aircraft carriers and cruisers and 30 per cent of auxiliary carriers and battleships off Okinawa had been sunk or heavily damaged." Still, the kamikazes were putting the US Navy through its most devastating stretch of the war--and possibly of its history. On the Island, American columns slowed by torrential rain and mud continued to deal with pockets of hell. In the west, the marines had to pass Sugar Hill, a low height protected on each flank by higher hills filled with Japanese firing positions. A week of fighting brought the 6th Marines through a crack west of the hill, while the 1st Marines battled through a series of equally hideous ridges and defiles to surmount Shuri Heights. To the east, the 77th and 96th army divisions struggled past a series of bristling hills called Flattop, Dick, and Conical. Finally, on May 23, as marines flooded into the city of Naha and GIs tramped into Yonabaru, Ushijima retreated again. Marines planted their 1st Division flag atop Shuri castle. The campaign was all but over. As American troops enveloped the bottom of the island in June, they discovered cave after cave of bloated corpses, unattended wounded soldiers, and sickly Japanese and native Okinawans. Many had committed suicide, as Ushijima and his second-in-command did on June 21. Their nightmare over, members of the Tenth Army breathed easier--but not much easier. Just around the corner was the invasion of mainland Japan, in which many of them expected to die. The Battle of Okinawa cost the US Army 4,675 men (including Buckner, who was killed on June 18); the marines 2,398; and the navy 4,907. Thousands more were wounded. Nearly all of Japan's 32nd Army was dead. But now the wound-up American war machine was parked just outside Japan, ready to crush it once and for all. By mid-1944, American factories had begun churning out massive B-29 Superfortresses, airborne marvels capable of delivering 4,000 tons of bombs each from bases in the Marianas and Iwo Jima. From Okinawa, the B-29s would be able to deliver five times that amount, a terrifying rate that air force planners hoped might knock Japan out of the war without a ground invasion. Planning for such a ground invasion was nonetheless well under way. Code-named Downfall, the two-part assault would dwarf even the massive Okinawa effort, the sheer size of which had eclipsed the 1944 invasion of France. The first step, called Operation Olympic, was set for November 1 and would be taken on Japan's southernmost island, Kyushu. If necessary, the second step, Operation Coronet, would land on Japan's main island of Honshu in the spring of 1946. Rear Admiral DeWitt C. Ramsey promised the assault on Japan would "be made by the most overwhelming forces ever concentrated in military history." One estimate put the total invasion force at an astounding seven million men. But even such a gargantuan force as that would suffer going against a nation of potential suicide attackers. Japan's hard-line leaders planned to employ all able-bodied Japanese, male and female, in defensive combat. Further, they mandated that every man and woman must be ready to give his or her life in suicide attacks. Already, millions of civilians--including young schoolchildren--were learning to kill with homemade spears, knives, and household tools, as well as with handguns and grenades. American casualty estimates for the attack ran as high as one million, a frightful amount that prompted a search for a better solution. One possibility was the atomic bomb, which had been in secret development at US sites for several years. Final testing and planning for delivery of this secret weapon that reportedly would wipe out an entire city were almost complete. For the time being, however, American planners stepped up air attacks on the island nation, still hoping to coax Emperor Hirohito to surrender. During the summer of 1945, dozens of Japanese cities crumbled. Unchallenged by Japanese fighters, which were being hoarded for the expected invasion, American carrier-based P-51 Mustangs bombed and strafed grounded planes, trains, and any buildings still standing in Japan, while the big B-29s mined Japanese waters and dropped thousands of tons of incendiary bombs, fragmentary bombs, and the new napalm bombs on a dwindling number of island targets. The size of the attacking B-29 formations increased, eventually reaching a staggering 700 planes or more on some raids. Pilots were told to leave four selected cities, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki, intact, although no one explained why. The island nation was quickly disintegrating into ash and dust. "Japan will eventually be a nation without cities--a nomadic people," warned Lieutenant General James H. Doolittle. On July 26, an American-drafted letter representing the United States, Great Britain, and China, called on Japan to surrender. Known as the Potsdam Declaration, the document implied that Japan might retain its emperor, but insisted upon the unconditional capitulation of its armed forces at the risk of "complete and utter destruction." Officially, Japan ignored the letter. On August 1, while American air force planners waited for perfect weather conditions for the bomb (which had recently been successfully tested in New Mexico), 784 B-29s ranged over Japan, dropping incendiaries on the lightly constructed homes that filled the nation's suburbs. Still, Japan remained silent. By then, after having considered all alternatives, President Harry Truman had authorized use of the atomic bomb. The skies over Japan were quiet on the beautiful morning of August 6, 1945. Only the rumbling of two lumbering B-29s cruising 31,600 feet over the city of Hiroshima disturbed the morning air until 8:15 a.m., when one of the planes, the Enola Gay, opened her bomb bay doors. The big bomber released one massive bomb--nicknamed Little Boy--and headed south at high speed. Moments later, a huge cloud shot 10,000 feet into the sky, and invisible waves of vibrations gave the escaping B-29 crew members the shaking of their lives. Previously spared the heavy bombing dealt to most other Japanese cities, Hiroshima had, in seconds, suffered more than 100,000 casualties, including 78,000 dead. Despite the unearthly horror the bomb had brought to earth, Japan's leaders still did not give in. So, three days later, a second B-29, named Bock's Car, unloaded a second bomb, over Nagasaki, killing 45,000 instantly and wounding and terrifying thousands of others. But as Truman anxiously awaited a Japanese surrender, rumors of plots against Hirohito swirled around Tokyo. Even as Soviet armies steamrolled Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea, the hard-liners of Japan's war cabinet still refused to give in, preferring to fight the Americans in one last decisive battle on their homeland. Finally, however, the emperor overruled them. At noon on August 15, millions of Japanese stood by their radios, listening in reverence as a recorded message from Hirohito was broadcast across the nation. Stunned by the mere sound of his voice, millions wept as he spoke of defeat, the enemy's "new and most cruel bomb," and the necessity for the Japanese people to preserve peace for future generations by "enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable." Some soldiers vowed to fight on or kill themselves; some fainted; others simply could not believe their efforts had gone for naught. Most citizens felt at once stunned, angry, worried, and relieved. Back in America, it was 7:00 p.m. on August 14 when Truman stepped before eager reporters in his White House office and announced the surrender. In New York City's Times Square, half a million people who had gathered in eager anticipation of such an announcement went into a tizzy when the board on the New York Times Tower flashed the news: "Official--Truman announces Japanese surrender." Within three hours, another one and a half million frenzied New Yorkers had joined their fellow citizens in Times Square. Clubs, bars, and restaurants filled to overflowing with excited patrons who drank, sang, and toasted the fall of Japan. Almost lost in the din were those reflecting somberly on lost brothers and sisters, fathers and mothers, husbands and wives, and sons and daughters. In Washington, DC, 10,000 delirious city residents gathered across from the White House in Lafayette Park, where they celebrated wildly. Music blared, people sang, and soldiers, sailors, and civilians meandered happily across the park in a long conga line. At 8:00 p.m., the president answered cries of "We want Truman!" by walking out onto the White House's north lawn. He took in the scene with a smile, then spoke: Ladies and gentlemen: This is a great day. This is the day we have all been looking for since December 7, 1941. This is the day when fascism and police government ceases in the world. This is the day for democracies. This is the day when we can start on our real task of implementation of free government in the world where we are faced with the greatest task we've ever been faced with. The emergency is as great as it was on December 7, 1941. It is going to take the help of all of us to do it. I know we are going to do it. Half a hemisphere away, thousands of inspired Argentines took to the streets of Buenos Aires, celebrating the Allied triumph over fascism and calling for democracy and freedom in their own country. Government-backed Nationalists answered their calls with clubs, guns, and brass knuckles. Most people around the world were too relieved to protest or even discuss politics. Dancing and singing broke out in cities and towns from England and France to New Zealand and Australia. Parades rolled through the streets of Havana, Ottawa, even remote Tegucigalpa in Honduras. The long horror was over. It was time to celebrate. American soldiers scattered across the globe let loose. "No sleep tonight," one American soldier exclaimed. Scores of his fellow GIs stationed in England went wild in London's West End, tramping gleefully through streets with the Stars and Stripes and bellowing "Yankee Doodle Dandy" and other tunes at the top of their lungs. In Moscow, where General Dwight D. Eisenhower was quietly celebrating with Soviet officials, an army band played and American whiskey flowed. Japan's surrender was made official on September 2, 1945, in a solemn ceremony aboard the Battleship Missouri. General Douglas MacArthur spoke and called for a new era of peace in the Pacific. He then saluted the millions of Americans who had fought to win the peace, praised American families that had persevered and worried for years while their loved ones fought overseas. He told them finally what they had longed to hear about their girls and boys: "They are homeward bound--Take care of them." ............................................................... Eric Ethier has worked as a research associate at Mystic Seaport in Connecticut and as an editor for American History and Civil War Times magazines. This article was originally published in the August 2005 issue of America in WWII. | |||||
